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ABSTRACT

The significance of continuing segregation in Chicago's public schools is discussed in this report. The failure of the "Access to Excellence" program to achieve voluntary school integration in spite of magnet programs and permissive transfers is described. The question of white flight is examined in light of the belief that mandatory desegregation increases white flight while voluntary plans stabilize or increase white enrollment in inner city schools. Also discussed is the question of the instability of naturally integrated neighborhoods and the relationship between school and neighborhood integration. The experiences of other cities with respect to white flight are described. The metropolitan-wide voluntary plans nature of the segregation problem in Chicago is discussed in terms of the need to stabilize neighborhood integration. The State policy that every school should reflect the approximate racial composition of the school district is criticized. An alternative to this pattern is suggested for Chicago public schools. Policy options for the State Board of Education are discussed. (Author/MC)

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VOLUNTARY DESEGREGATION IN CHICAGO

A Report to

Joseph Cronin, State Superintendent of Education

February 26, 1979

Gary Orfield
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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INTRODUCTION

Last spring I chaired a committee of experts on school desegregation appointed by State Superintendent Joseph Cronin to analyze the desegregation plan submitted by the Chicago Public Schools. The committee's May 11 report, Integration in Chicago, reviewed the background of school and housing segregation in Chicago and the Chicago metropolitan area. It concluded that the area had the most intense segregation in the nation and that there were no signs of significant improvement. It noted strong patterns of continuing expansion of segregation in the city and suburbs and suggested that the state move toward policies that recognized the metropolitan dimensions of segregation. It analyzed the Chicago plan in detail and reported that it would be very expensive and would have a minimal impact on segregation, reaching not more than 2 percent of Chicago's students. It reported that there was very strong evidence that segregation in Chicago was not de facto, but was heavily influenced by a long history of constitutional violations both by the school and the housing authorities.

This December, shortly before Chicago submitted its Status Report on the Access to Excellence Plan, I was requested to review the document by Superintendent Cronin and his Deputy Superintendent Nelson Ashline. Unfortunately resources were not available to reassemble the Technical Assistance Committee on the Chicago Desegregation Plan. This report, therefore, is the sole responsibility of the author. This report will discuss the significance of Chicago desegregation, analyze the record of Access to Excellence, discuss possible changes in the state desegregation rules, examine racial

change in metropolitan Chicago, and discuss ways in which school and housing policy can begin to support and expand residential desegregation. It will summarize the very limited accomplishments to date and discuss approaches open to the state board and other agencies.

It is important for the reader to know at the outset that there are limitations in some of the statistics used in the analysis. Chicago's report lacks essential information on the origin of students in desegregated programs, the number in full-time desegregated settings, and other issues. It is not clear how the count was taken in the schools and whether some children were double-counted. The state government has been very hesitant about demanding the production of the necessary data. My best judgment is that a full and accurate accounting, if one ever becomes available, will show a somewhat weaker performance than the statistics analyzed in this study. I have simply analyzed the data as reported by Chicago. I would like to express my appreciation to Sally Pancrazio and William Humm of the Illinois Office of Education for assistance in some of the statistical computations required by the report. The interpretations, of course, are my own.

Gary Orfield
University of Illinois
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February 22, 1979

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHICAGO CASE

Chicago is not just one case for the state board of education, it is the single problem that will do more to influence the future of segregated education than all the rest of the state actions combined. In fact it is a case of very great regional and national importance. The twelve-state Midwest area, according to the most recent federal statistics is the most segregated in the U.S., twice as segregated as the Southeast region which includes Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia, the last bastions of Southern segregation. There are now approximately 1.2 million segregated minority children in the midwest. About a third of the total segregation in the twelve states is in the Chicago metropolitan area.[1] Almost a twelfth of all the segregated schools in the nation are in this one urban complex which contains about a thirtieth of the national population. Since Chicago is the most segregated urban concentration in America and one of its great centers of communications and politics, decisions on Chicago will reverberate across the country.

The Chicago case is also of great importance as a test of the state board's ability to devise new rules and standards to deal realistically with an area fundamentally different from the rest of the state and to enforce those rules when they are announced. Virtually everyone, including local and state education officials, anti-busing groups, civil rights groups, and the press agree that the existing standards will not work. I am convinced that they are not only wrong for Chicago but for a number of suburbs as well. Unless the state board can agree on a better standard, the initiative will pass very largely to Chicago school authorities to invent and evaluate their own desegration standards. A decision should no longer be delayed.

The case also has great significance because it is the only action under way which might noticeably alter the traditions of segregation in Chicago. In a city whose development has been shaped and whose economy has been devastated by the ghettoization process, any move against the nation's most intense segregation is of great importance. If possible this plan must be designed in a way to create stable integration, something that has been rare in Chicago. More than a decade of housing litigation, reaching the Supreme Court in the Gautreaux case, has integrated only a few hundred families in Chicago. A properly drawn school plan will touch scores of thousands.

Accomplishments of the Access to Excellence Program

After the expenditure of $35.4 million and the announcement of dozens of new programs it seems reasonable to undertake a preliminary assessment of the accomplishments of the Chicago desegregation plan. The plan has been widely publicized throughout the country as an effective alternative to mandatory desegregation. Chicago school authorities and the Chicago press have strongly and insistently argued that the progress toward desegregation has been sufficient to justify suspending the state regulations which require involuntary reassignment of students if voluntary efforts fail.

Access to Excellence has failed. Its impact on Chicago segregation has been negligible. After implementation of the plan the city's segregation remains far higher than many communities before they began desegregation. The city's minority children remain the most segregated in the U.S. There are serious charges that the plan has made the city's separate education more unequal by locating the challenging educational programs outside the areas where black and Latino children remain in segregated schools. Nor has the plan stabilized white enrollment. That decline is large and it increased this school year.

Access to Excellence was a major test of a voluntary approach in a very unfavorable climate. I will not attempt to judge its motivations, but rather I will assume that it was a sincere effort whose designers expected to succeed. The publicity about the program, on the other hand, and the editorial response of the press, have been seriously inaccurate and sometimes intentionally misleading.

Setting aside concerns about the inadequacy of the data provided by Chicago, the school board's own figures show that 97 percent of the city's black students and 85 percent of the Latino students remain in predominantly minority schools. The index of segregation, which shows that last year 91 percent of black students would have had to be moved to achieve a random distribution of black and white students, this year moved to 90.3 percent. For Latinos, it remained constant at 65.0 . Segregation is highest in the elementary grades, reaching an index level of 93 for the separation of blacks from whites. Latino children are also highly segregated from blacks, the statistics show an overall index of 88.0 and a level of 91.6 for the elementary schools. Chicago's segregation, as measured by this index is far above the levels reported in other major districts. These levels have been virtually constant for more than a decade.

Table 1
Chicago Segregation Indexes, 1968-78

	White from Black	White from Latino	Black from Latino
1968	90	65	88
1970	90	65	89
1972	91	64	89
1974	92	65	89
1976	92	65	89
1978 (after plan)	90	65	88

SOURCE: Calculations by Reynolds Farley and Illinois Office of Education (Measured by Dissimilarity Indes)

Another way of examining progress toward desegregation is to examine the racial composition of the typical school attended by students of different

racial backgrounds. The calculations of this figure, the exposure index, show that although the large majority of non-white children are in segregated schools, the remaining schools which enroll white children are somewhat less segregated. The typical white Chicago student went to school where one-twelfth of the students were black in 1977 and a tenth were this school year. The typical central city white student is now in a school with 10.5 percent black enrollment and 17.9 percent Latino students.[2] In part this change reflects the decline in overall white enrollment and the speed of racial transition in some areas of town. At any rate, white students in Chicago are not so isolated as they once were.

Although the city-wide average has improved there are very large numbers of schools which continue to have strikingly unrepresentative student bodies. 278 of the city's 642 attendance centers had 39 percent or more minority students, after implementation of the desegregation plan. The large majority of these schools, 240 to be specific, did not have one white student. There were on the other hand 175 schools with less than one-tenth black students in a school system where 61 percent of the children were black.[3]

There was a measurable increase this year in the number of Chicago schools that comply with the state's desegregation standard, with enrollments within 15 percent of the district-wide white-minority population distribution. Last year the standard (which no one proposes to enforce fully in Chicago) would have required that each school have between 61 and 91 percent minority students. This year the figures are 63.5-93.5. The number of schools that comply has increased by 10, or 1 1/2 percent of

the city's schools. This increase has been hailed as a sign of progress. On the average, however, these schools are approximately 70 percent minority with declining white enrollments and were moving rapidly toward further resegregation. They were not schools that were desegregated by the plan (see details in Table 3) but were schools that happened to be in rapid racial transition. This kind of "progress" might well be much more a by-product of accelerated resegregation across the city. It certainly offered no prospect of stable desegregation.

Magnet Programs and Permissive Transfers. The central hope for increased integration through the Access to Excellence program is voluntary selection of magnet schools by both minority and white children and voluntary transfers of minority children to fill strictly limited numbers of available seats in white schools. The second element, the permissive transfer program has been more successful to date. Magnet programs have never fully desegregated an urban school district and Chicago's record to date has been far worse than some of the other cities which have tried this approach. It is clear from the school district enrollment statistics that the permissive transfer program of the past two years has allowed the first steps toward integration in some white areas. The magnet school programs have produced no discernible impact. Overall the city has fallen far short of its very modest goal of bringing about 2 percent of the students into integrated full-time programs this year.

About half of the additional full-time desegregation which was clearly pledged by the Access to Excellence plan was expected to come from almost 4500 additional voluntary transfers of minority children to predominantly white schools. The Chicago schools reported this fall a transfer

of 2570 students, but did not provide racial data. If one takes this data at face value and assumes that the old Chicago practice of permitting transfers which do not increase desegregation has ended, this movement would transfer about half of one percent of the city's students to less segregated settings. This plan is doubtless one of the factors in accounting for the small increase in minority students in the typical school attended by a white child.

Magnet schools were expected to provide the bulk of the increased integration. Some cities, notably Milwaukee and Cincinnati, have devised programs which have stimulated transfers of a substantial number of minority children and a few whites. Given Chicago's level of segregation and the belief of most black Chicago parents that their children's schools are inferior these programs should have had some impact on segregation levels if effectively implemented.[4] In Chicago, most of the special programs were not even designed for full-time desegregation, they were programs that briefly brought together groups of children for shared experiences. A number of the full-time programs that were created opened on a segregated basis, since the necessary white volunteers did not materialize. The existing city-wide magnets actually experienced a decline in enrollment, particularly white enrollment. The new magnet programs which were integrated had very small numbers of students desegregating only a small fraction of one percent of the students.

Table 2

RACIALLY STABILIZED AND MAGNET SCHOOL PROGRAMS
Fall 1977-Fall 1978

School Name	Percent Minority 1978	Change in Number Minority Students	Change in Number White Students	Change in Percent Minority Students
Young	73.7	+ 28	-26	+1.1
Morgan Park	59.3	-238	-75	- 2.0
Gage Park	55.4	- 48	+17	- 2.0
Gage Park Branch	61.5	+17	- 3	+2.2
Disney	56.5	+25	-45	+2.1
Metro	74.0	+49	-49	+14.4

SELECTED NEW MAGNET PROGRAMS, Fall 1978

	Percent Minority	Number of Whites	Number, Minorities
BEARD CLASSIC	29	129	52
GREEN CLASSIC	28	165	64
MC DADE CLASSIC	97	9	277
PRE-SCHOOL CENTERS	76.9	49	164
LA SALLE LANGUAGE CENTER	59	142	317

SOURCE: Chicago Public Schools Fall Housing Reports, 1977-1978.

A number of the programs were expensive and should have been very appealing if any kind of magnets were going to work. The district's pre-school program, for example, was budgeted at $1,114,795 for the year. At a time when pre-school day care is widely regarded as both inadequate and too expensive, a free public school program with good support should have been immensely popular. Yet the two schools that opened in the fall had only been able to attract 49 white students from the entire city by December. One of the buildings was 89 percent minority, the other 66 percent.[5]

Some of the programs created in earlier years and scheduled to expand actually shrank. Those without strict quotes had a rising minority proportion. The net impact of these efforts in increasing the number of children in substantially integrated schools was a few hundred students for the entire city. There was no likelihood that the kind of magnet programs created so far in Chicago could even desegregate one-tenth of the city's schools over several years of work. Many of the district-based magnet programs opened with more than 90 percent minority students.

The desegregation which is indicated in some of the district-created programs devised within regions of the city is very difficult to interpret. To cite one example, the statistics look good on a four-school elementary cluster, containing Field, Hayt, Swift and Kilmer schools. When one looks more closely, however, one learns that even before the plan started each of the schools was above the maximum white enrollment permitted under the state rules and three had substantial white majorities. The reshuffling of children among these four schools may well have served

educational purposes but it should not be reported as a gain in desegregation. Accurately assessing the Access plan would require a school-by-school analysis of problems of this sort, which reflect the fact that Access is a bewildering series of uncoordinated actions which often have only tangential relationships to desegregation.

The experience of Milwaukee, Los Angeles and Boston, suggests that magnet schools enrollment will expand most rapidly when they offer an alternative to mandatory busing. Under specific yearly requirements, necessary to avoid mandatory provisions, the Milwaukee school officials succeeded in desegregating about three-fourths of their schools, primarily through one-way voluntary transfers by black children.[6] In Los Angeles, the magnet program grew rapidly after desegregation became inevitable, with white enrollment in magnets growing by 67 percent this fall.[7] In Boston, after a mandatory plan was already in operation, magnet schools were very attractive to white and minority parents. Perhaps the State Board could consider directing Chicago to achieve a fixed percentage of desegregation next fall through voluntary student choices by June or be required to implement specific mandatory reassignments needed to reach that goal in September. A requirement of this sort would create a strong incentive for school officials to encourage voluntary transfers and for white families to look seriously at the educational opportunities offered by the new programs.

Last spring the Technical Assistance Committee estimated that the Access plan might desegregate 2 percent of Chicago pupils.[8] It is now clear that it has fallen far short of that goal. Much of what appears to be increased desegregation has nothing to do with the plan but reflects neighborhood transition and the accelerating decline of white enrollment.

Throughout the history of school desegregation, voluntary plans which have made any significant impact have required very strong supporting efforts to encourage transfers. Open enrollment plans in the South brought very few transfers until HEW required specific annual percentages of desegregation to avoid mandatory plans. The partial successes in Milwaukee and Cincinnati required a very strong administrative commitment throughout the districts and the clear threat of a court order. Even under such circumstances magnet plans have failed very badly in Houston, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Diego, Seattle, and elsewhere. The record shows no reasonable prospect for any real success in Chicago.

The White Flight Issue

Perhaps the most frequent justification of the Access to Excellence plan is the widespread belief that the relatively small number of whites still in the Chicago schools will leave for the suburbs if they are desegregated. City administrators and the city's newspapers have continually pointed to this threat, often citing the experience with the Los Angeles desegregation plan last fall.[9]

There are several parts to the argument over white flight and each deserves careful examination. The themes of the argument include:

(1) the belief that whites will flee from any mandatory desegregation

(2) the belief that educationally attractive voluntary plans can stabilize or increase the white enrollment

(3) natural neighborhood integration is more stable

(4) the assertion that the experience in Los Angeles, the district closest in size to Chicago, and the experience of other districts with large busing plans demonstrate the cost of the plans in declining white enrollment.

Mandatory busing does not appear to be the central factor in white population decline. Almost all of the large urban districts with major desegregation plans have mandatory busing. White flight in the early stages of a desegregation plan was worst in Memphis, where an extensive series of private fundamentalist schools (called segregation academies by the Southern Regional Council) were organized the year of desegregation.[10] The typical large Florida with a massive county-wide busing plan lost only about 3 percent of the white students.[11]

The research literature in the field appears to demonstrate the

importance of several factors. (1) White flight appears to be most significant in school districts with few white children surrounded by school systems which are virtually all white. (2) There is usually relatively little flight from metropolitan plans. (3) Whites are substantially more likely to leave if they are assigned to a ghetto or barrio school than if minority children are assigned to their school. (4) The enrollment decline is worst in the first year of desegregation. (5) Over the long term white flight makes relatively little difference in the racial composition of the school district.

Given the situation in most central city school systems, beginning a desegregation plan is very likely to produce some added white flight, at least at the outset. If stabilizing the white population is the primary concern there should obviously be a very strong effort to obtain metropolitan desegregation if some form of desegregation is inevitable. There should also be an emphasis upon building in some aspects of educational choice into the mandatory framework. Finally, serious consideration should be given to the kind of explicit integration-maintenance controls attempted in Gage Park and Morgan Park. These schools have remained integrated longer than might have been expected and they have surely played a positive role in the neighborhood. Such arrangements may deal with one aspect of the fears of whites--the fear that the school will soon become virtually all-minority.

The white flight from school desegregation does not usually make much difference in the ultimate composition of the city's schools. The flight, which is largely made up of families who refuse to even try the newly desegregated schools may accelerate the pre-existing rate of decline in white enrollments by about a year. Doing nothing, leaving segregation untouched,

might have held white enrollment at its preexisting rate of decline for another year.

Part or all of the loss in white students at the time of desegregation may be recovered later, according to the research of Prof. Christine Rossell of Boston University. Perhaps the beginning of desegregation only temporarily speeds up the loss of enrollment that would have occurred anyway. Rossell reports that three of the four studies of the long-term impact of plans show that after the transition the annual loss may be less than was normal before desegregation. Her statistical analysis of 113 school districts shows that the annual white flight is less than normal by the third year of desegregation and there is an "especially pronounced" positive turn "by the fifth year."[12] This year in Boston, the site of the most intense recent resistance to a desegregation plan, the white enrollment decline was less than one-third the Chicago level under Access to Excellence.[13] For county-wide metropolitan plans in the South, she reports, the net long-term effect is to produce less total flight than the statistical trend before desegregation would have suggested. In large central cities with a heavy minority population and two-way busing, she concludes that the overall long-term loss is about 5.7 percent of the white students.[14] If that were the pattern in Chicago, desegregation of the schools would accelerate the existing process of racial change by slightly more than a half year.

Even if there is a larger speedup of white enrollment decline, the long-range impact would not be very consequential. Demographic projections of Los Angeles before desegregation showed that the city would have 14 percent white students within a decade if the pre-existing demographic trends held. With a major first year loss, Reynolds Farley concluded, the white

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figure might drop to 12 percent in a decade. In Chicago, where projections show fewer than a tenth white students by 1986 if nothing is done a substantial white flight might marginally reduce this small number. Whether the number is 10 percent or 9 percent and whether the year is 1984 or 1985 will not make a decisive difference for the city. The practical reality is that, whatever is done, Chicago must soon look to the suburbs if it wishes to maintain schools with significant white enrollment.

Voluntary Plans and White Retention. Chicago's current plan and its past history offers an excellent test of the proposition that whites will remain in the city if they are offered a high level of segregation plus some special educational programs. No city has had less integration to drive out sensitive whites. Chicago's segregation level has long been the highest in the U.S.

Chicago has has the distinction of simultaneously maintaining singularly high segregation and an unusually rapid white flight. The following table shows that among the ten largest central cities Chicago's segregation level was by far the highest from 1970-76, yet it was losing one in fourteen of its white students each year on the average. During 1967-76 most major cities showed some decline in their segregation index but in Chicago it rose two points. White flight grew as segregation increased.

Table 3

Segregation Index for Black Students and Average Decline in White Enrollment, Ten Largest Central Cities

	1970-1976 Yearly Decline	Segregation Index, 1976
New York	- 4.8%	48
Chicago	- 7.3%	90
Los Angeles	- 6.0%	81
Philadelphia	- 3.5%	77
Houston	- 8.5%	72
Detroit	-13.3%	63
Baltimore	- 8.1%	67
Dallas	- 9.7%	63
San Diego	- 3.5%	51
Washington	- 6.5%	84
AVERAGE YEARLY LOSS	-7.1%	

SOURCE: Reynolds Farley Report to Los Angeles Superior Court

If educational quality would hold white students in Chicago one would have expected some moderation of the existing trends with the creation of the first magnet schools and, this fall, with the development of a great number of new programs. Last year, however, the white enrollment fell 9.2 percent. This fall it was up to 10.2 percent of the white students. White enrollment dropped from 131,000 in September 1976 to 107,000 two years later. The decline in future enrollment was likely to be even more drastic, according to figures on entries into first grade. First grade white students went from 34,023 last school year to 29,828 this year, a 12.3 percent drop in a single year. Only about a seventh of the incoming first graders in the city were white.

The basic reality of Chicago and its school system is one of rapid and continuing racial change, even in largely white areas with special educational programs. The pattern is so clear that it is also evident in the parochial schools, which would be a primary alternative for young families objecting to public school conditions by wishing to live in the city. The Chicago Archdiocese, which operates the larges Catholic school system in the nation, has had declining white enrollment and growing minority enrollment in the city for years. This year's statistics show another drop in Catholic enrollment.

Obviously the statistics show very strong white flight yet little reason for it if whites leave primarily because of school desegregation. The pattern of white outmigration dates back to the 1930s in Chicago. It is explained by many factors in addition to race, including the availability of land for large scale residential construction, the nature of the housing

market, problems with central city services and taxes, the suburbanization of jobs in the past generation, the fear of crime, the lower housing costs in the distant parts of suburbia, advice of realtors, etc.[16] There has been very substantial suburbanization even in cities with few blacks and Latinos like Minneapolis.

Special circumstances in the 1970s, independent of the schools, may have helped accelerate the change in Chicago and other major cities. This was a period of very rapid housing construction in spite of a net outflow of people from the metropolitan area. The new construction tends to draw whites out. At the other end the enactment of the federal fair housing law in 1968 made it more difficult to contain the expansion of minority communities. Fueled by the added housing demand created by the minority economic progress of the sixties, the period saw a rapid growth of ghettos and barrios. Unfortunately it brought no significant progress on residential desegregation.

The process becomes a vicious cycle. As more people with means leave the city the city becomes less able to finance services and there are fewer powerful groups to demand performance from city agencies. As conditions become worse more people leave, making conditions still worse. As demand for housing in the desirable white suburbs rises it puts housing prices further and further out of reach for young minority families.

The root problem with white flight is often not the actual flight of people living in the neighborhood or city, but the failure of whites to continue to move in. Since the average American moves every six years, the failure to replace the white families in an integrated area soon produces resegregation.[17] On the school level, when new white families with school age

children no longer buy houses in the area, either rapid decline or racial transition of the area's schools becomes inevitable. When one considers that only one-seventh of the children entering first grade this year are whites, it is apparent that the entire city of Chicago is suffering from this problem. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy of very great social importance.

The Instability of Naturally Integrated Neighborhoods

One of the ironic features of the white flight issue is the fact that flight may be more rapid in residentially integrated areas than in cities with busing plans, particularly in the long run. The reason is not hard to understand, when one considers Chicago's history. Urban sociologists of the 1920s and 1930s documented the block-by-block, neighborhood-by-neighborhood expansion of the ghetto. The process has been deeply institutionalized and its impact on Chicago neighborhoods in the 1970s was demonstrated in the Chicago Urban League's 1978 report, Where Blacks Live. The League's study reported that more than 1000 square blocks in four areas of the city were in the racial change process in the seventies.[18]

In Chicago's "naturally integrated" areas, schools change sooner and faster than the neighborhood residential pattern because the whites in an older city neighborhood tend to have relatively few school age children. The new minority families not only have a higher average income than those they replace but also many more school age children. As the school begins to show a substantial minority presence it triggers a self-fulfilling prophecy of resegregation. Outside of a handful of neighborhoods, substantial integration has never stabilized in the Chicago schools. School authorities have rarely aided stabilization and sometimes actively participated in resegregation.

Perhaps this syndrome is a basic reason why researchers at the University of Wisconsin reported last summer that "naturally integrated" schools across
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the U.S. had a very high level of white flight. They were not integrated but merely at a phase in their transition, like the schools that happened to come into compliance with the state board of education's desegregation guidelines this summer.

Neighborhood integration that has lasted in the Chicago schools has required strong and continuing efforts in behalf of integration. Hyde Park enjoyed active and effective community organizations and the assets of the University of Chicago community. The Gage Park and Morgan Park efforts have had very clear policies and standards to provide an assurance of continuing integration. Integration does not happen by accident in a community whose institutions and expectations create an extremely powerful momentum of expanding segregation. Natural school integration is not possible on any scale in Chicago because there is little natural stable housing integration. Much of the city has long been past the stage where there can be any natural integration unless whites with young children can be persuaded to move in and send their children to schools that are almost all minority.

Lessons on White Flight from Los Angeles and Elsewhere

Although Chicago's Access plan has had slight impact on segregation it would have been much worse, Chicago defenders have often argued, if the city had adopted a desegregation plan like that implemented this September in Los Angeles. It is true that Los Angeles had a sharp decline in white enrollment this fall, 15.1 percent in contrast to Chicago's 10.2 percent. Los Angeles

implemented a poorly designed plan, with an unusually high level of busing white children into minority schools. Because of Los Angeles geography and demographic patterns, many of the children faced long rides on freeways and much of the busing had to be across the Santa Monica mountains. Chicago would be far less difficult to desegregate in terms of transportation. The best estimates, based on a series of statistical analyses completed in January, are that busing accelerated white flight from Los Angeles city schools by 5-7 percent above the trend of recent history. Compared with last year, flight increased 3.9 percent.[20]

The decline of white students was particularly high among those schools which had compulsory reassignments, reaching the level of approximately three-tenths of the whites, although some of that loss was offset by very dramatic growth of magnet school programs. Magnets gained 67 percent more whites this year once the mandatory programs were implemented. The currently integrated schools, in integrated areas or receiving volunteer minority student transfers, were far more stable as were the mid-site receiving schools, which received both minority and white children.[21]

The basic trends in the two cities, however, are similar. The decline in first grade white enrollment, a key predictor of the future of a school district, was virtually identical between the two cities this fall, although Chicago was offering Access to Excellence and Los Angeles was in the midst of a very controversial desegregation plan, suspended in total uncertainty by conflicting court decisions until just days before school opened. In Los Angeles these trends of white suburbanization have also been reinforced by a very intense inflation in the cost of housing in the white areas of the city

and a continuing heavy in-migration of minority families. Chicago's dominant minority group, blacks, is producing a declining number of students and there is no net in-migration. In Los Angeles the dominant minority group is Hispanic and there is both a strong in-migration and a high birth rate among Mexican-American families.

Chicago can learn lessons from the Los Angeles experience. First, a magnet school plan, like Access to Excellence, can be far more successful in the face of mandatory programs. Second, desegregation on sites that are still integrated or outside the heart of the ghetto or barrio will hold more white children. Third, whatever is done in cities like Chicago and Los Angeles, the central city schools will be overwhelmingly minority within the relatively near future in the absence of suburban participation in a desegregation plan. For this reason, the court-appointed experts in the Los Angeles case have given the highest priority to various forms of suburban involvement in school and housing integration.

Table 4

Comparative Segregation of Blacks from Whites
Chicago and Los Angeles
196 -1978

	Chicago	Los Angeles
1967	90	91
1968	90	91
1969	90	90
1970	90	89
1971	90	88
1972	91	87
1973	92	86
1974	92	84
1975	92	83
1976	92	81
1977	91	77
1978	90	71

SOURCE: Tabulations by Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan using the dissimilarity index.

Table 5

Decline in White Enrollment
Chicago and Los Angeles, 1968-1978

	Chicago	Los Angeles
1968	219,000	348,000
1970	200,000	318,000
1972	173,000	283,000
1974	153,000	251,000
1976	131,000	219,000
1977	119,000	195,000
1978	107,000	165,000
NET DECLINE	112,000	183,000
Percent Decline	-51.1%	-52.6%
Average Percent Annual Decline	-5.1%	- 5.3%
1977-78 Percent Decline	-10.2%	-15.1%
Decline in Entering Group (new first graders 1977-78)	-12.3%	-12.6%

Source: Farley Calculations for Technical Assistance Committee, April 1978 and for Los Angeles Superior Court, January 1979; Chicago Fall Housing Report, 1978

The Metropolitan Dimension

The central issue of school desegregation as the seventies end has become the possibility of dealing with the development of nearly all-minority school systems within many of our largest central cities. In a quarter century of legal development the most segregated part of the country, the rural South, has become the most integrated and the most intense segregation is concentrated in those great Northern cities which provided such strong support for the movement to desegregate the South. The problem is most acute in the five largest cities of the North and West--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Detroit. These cities are the loci of the development of segregation on a vast scale never before seen in the United States. Chicago has the most segregated central city and the most segregated metro area both in schools and in housing.

Whether or not school desegregation generates white flight, there will be less than a tenth white children in the Chicago schools by 1986 if long-established demographic trends hold. Not only the white population but also much of the black and Latino middle class will be outside the Chicago schools. Parts of the suburbs will experience rapid growth in minority enrollment and spreading segregation. Cross-district desegregation will be essential if the great majority of Chicago minority children and most of those in the suburbs are to escape segregation. The Chicago suburbs had 88 percent white students last year, more than six times as many white students as the city. The suburbs also had a great deal of surplus school capacity due to a plummeting birth rate.

Table 6

Change in Minority Enrollment in
Selected Suburban Districts, Fall 1973-Fall 1978

District Name	Percent Minority Increase, 1973-78	Total Percent Minority, 1978
Bellwood (#88)	43.3%	62.6%
Harvey (#152)	26.7	82.0
Proviso Township (#209)	19.9	42.9
Calumet (#132)	25.1	33.8
Skokie (#73½)	10.1	15.9
Aurora East (#131)	15.2	47.1
Maywood-Melrose Park-Broadview (#89)	14.9	80.5
Oak Park (#97)	14.1	22.0
Chicago Heights (#170)	14.1	64.0
Park Forest (#163)	11.9	40.9
Joliet (#86)	13.9	50.3

SOURCE: Research and Statistics Section, Illinois Office of Education.

Table 7

AREAS, STUDENT ENROLLMENTS, AND RACIAL COMPOSITION FOR THE SIX-COUNTY AREA

COUNTY	Area (Sq. Miles)	1971 Enrollment	1977 Enrollment	1971-77 Enrollment Change	1971-77 Percent Change	1977 Percent Nonminority
COOK	957.1	1,049,313	928,313	—121,000	—11.5%	51.9%
City of Chicago	219.0	572,282	510,954	— 61,328	—10.7%	23.2%
Suburban Cook County	738.1	477,031	417,359	— 59,672	—12.5%	87.2%
DU PAGE	330.0	128,175	127,063	— 1,112	— 0.9%	95.5%
KANE	520.5	72,547	72,963	+ 416	+ 0.6%	84.9%
LAKE	474.6	93,443	95,024	+ 1,581	+ 1.7%	87.0%
MC HENRY	605.5	27,269	28,826	+ 1,557	+ 5.7%	98.0%
WILL	858.7	61,685	66,241	+ 4,556	+ 9.4%	84.5%

SOURCE: Chicago Public Schools

The South and West Side ghettos have reached the city boundaries and large scale black migration is reaching into the suburbs in both directions. The Leadership Council on Metropolitan Open Communities set up as a result of Martin Luther King's campaign to open the suburbs now spends a good deal of its energy attempting to stabilize suburban integration and avoid resegregation on the traditional Chicago model. Metropolitan Chicago has a number of school districts with few white students. All of the districts in Illinois which are changing most rapidly in racial composition are in the Chicago metropolitan area.[22]

The entire city of Chicago and parts of the suburbs now face some of the problems of resegregating neighborhoods. A very high proportion of whites with school age children do not even consider looking in city neighborhoods. Some guides for newcomers even contain warnings about the schools in these areas. Leaving things alone will do nothing to resolve this problem. If it is a priority for the city and the suburbs to maintain integration, and I certainly think it should be a very high priority, a school plan must be devised with this in mind and the resources of other city and suburban agencies must be brought to bear on helping upgrade areas threatened with ghettoization, helping open up segregated areas in the city and suburbs, encouraging settlement of young white families with children in revitalizing areas of the city and using housing subsidies to keep these communities integrated with minority familes, and very vigorously prosecuting cases of steering and panic peddling. Chicago has never had a plan for integration. Normally it has had clearcut implicit or explicit policies of segregation. A good school plan, and a strong appeal by the Chicago school board to other

city, suburban, state and federal agencies could be a first step toward integration.

The suburbs experiencing resegregation include many of the most open communities in the Chicago metropolitan area. One suburb West of Chicago is now experiencing a one percent a month change in racial composition of its schools.

Five of the ten Illinois school districts with at least one school that had a totally minority enrollment in 1977-78 were in the South Chicago suburbs. Another South suburban system had a school with less than a twentieth white children as did the Maywood-Melrose Park district in the Western suburbs and the older communities of Waukegan, Joliet, and Elgin which had been incorporated into the spreading metropolitan complex.

Most of the suburbs are involved in some form of municipal effort to stabilize integration and to open housing markets further out for minority housekeepers. Some of these efforts have involved skillful mobilization of a wide range of community programs and resources. Unless such communities are helped by agencies supporting integration it will become apparent that the most open areas will merely be the first to be ghettoized. Unless public authorities work together to aid in the integration efforts, whites in individual suburbs will realize that if they wish to remain they must follow the exclusionary and even segregationist policies commonly employed in other suburbs. The state board must develop policies to assist these communities.

WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR DESEGREGATION IN CHICAGO?

A central problem in evaluating Chicago's progress toward desegregation is that the measuring stick is unknown. The state board's stated policy requires that each school in a district reflect the approximate racial composition. To allow administrative flexibility the rules say that a system is fully desegregated if every school comes within 15 percent of the district-wide racial division.

The strategy is logical in most of the systems the state oversees. In my city of Champaign, for example, where the schools are about one-fourth black, this has meant that each school has had to have between approximately 10 percent and 40 percent black students. While there are sometimes problems, particularly when major adjustments have to be made to deal with population changes, the standard makes a great deal of sense. The entire system is integrated and has been for more than a decade. There are not schools perceived as white schools or black schools. The state standard both calls attention to emerging problems of resegregation and requires that action be taken long before a school becomes identified as a segregated ghetto institution.

A key fact is the nature of our metropolitan area. There is only one other major school district--Urbana--which has a similar population composition and a similar desegregation plan.

The problem with the standard comes in metropolitan areas like Chicago and East St. Louis, where a largely minority central city district is surrounded by largely white suburban systems (in Chicago a number of the suburban systems are also going through racial transition). In the East St. Louis

schools the 15 percent standard now means that a 100 percent black school is fully desegregated by state standards. This year in Chicago a desegregated school could have as many as 93.5 percent minority students. A school with two white children per classroom would be considered fully integrated. A Chicago school where ten of the twenty-six children in an average classroom were white would be considered segregated, because it had too many whites. In a metropolitan area where two-thirds of the public school students are white and a society where about three-fourths of the children are white, all Chicago schools would be required to have at least two-thirds minority students, in order to be integrated by current state standards. This definition makes no sense educationally or socially, nor does it reflect what either minority or white people define as integration. Retaining it would mean that within another four or five years a 100 percent minority school, of which there are now 240 in Chicago, could be considered integrated. Each school would be required to have at least three-fourths minority students.

Research in the South shows that blacks are least supportive of busing when their children are bussed to a largely black school.[24] If integration is to serve the purpose of giving black and Latino children better access to the overall society there must be a substantial presence of whites, the dominant group in the society and economy, in the integrated schools.

The problem is equally striking in a number of Chicago suburbs. In both the Western and Southern Chicago suburbs there are a number of communities that appear to be undergoing the kind of rapid racial transition that occurs to Chicago neighborhoods. Suppose that a suburb has 40 percent black and Latino public school enrollment (which might well mean that it had about

one-fifth minority residents). Every school in that system would have to have between 25 and 55 percent minority students. These schools would be strikingly different from those of the surrounding suburbs, which would often be almost all white.

Suburbs with substantial minority population normally become the target for steering in of minority homebuyers and steering out of whites, who are told that its a "changing area."

Within three or four years, as the minority enrollment grew 10 percent, the state rules would call for each school to be up to 65 percent minority to be desegregated. Although white suburban homebuyers would see a 65 percent minority school as a ghetto school rather than a stably integrated school, particularly in contrast to the all-white schools in adjoining areas, the state policies view each community in isolation from its context. On one side of a street the state rules may require that all children be in predominantly minority schools while children on the other side, in another school district, may attend all-white schools.

The faster a community is changing as the result of real estate practices, the faster it will be required to raise minority enrollment in each of its schools. As the minority enrollment reaches high levels, the state policies do nothing to stabilize integration. In some circumstances they may actually contribute further instability to an already highly unstable setting.

The confusion over the standard is endemic. The Chicago Sun-Times commented, for example in "Cronin has said he won't hold Chicago to that rule, but neither he nor the state board have said precisely what they'll settle for."[25] In September the superintendent had asked for "something much

closer to what the Urban League or the Citywide Advisory Committee recommended."[26] In late December State Board Chairman Jack Witkowsky and Equal Educational Opportunity Committee Chairman Donald Muirheid called openly for review of the rules.[27] In his campaign for governor, former Superintendent Michael Bakalis, announced that the rules he had devised were inappropriate in Chicago.[28] Chicago Defender columnist Nathanel Clay attacked the rules as unworkable.[29] The Chicago Urban League, which has done outstanding work on school and housing segregation in Chicago took note of the comments of the state officials and concluded that "there are no definite and specific requirements at all for a Chicago plan."

> The racial balance standard is worse than impractical for Chicago; it is now close to meaningless. Enforcement of the rule would require that white pupils concentrated in the northwest and southwest corners of the city be reassigned to...schools which are currently in all-black.... Not only would this generate a political and legal resistance which the State Board and the Board's Rules could hardly withstand, it most likely would render those rules vacuous.... If the number of white pupils should fall to 15 percent, for whatever reason, every school in Chicago which is 100 percent non-white would conform to the State Board's definition of an integrated school.[30]

The senselessness of the state rules in the Chicago setting becomes apparent when one examines closely the theory that integration increased in Chicago this year. The reports indicate that the number of schools integrated according to the state standards grew by ten this year, a sign of some small progress. When one examines the schools that came into compliance, however, it is apparent that they are largely rapidly changing resegregating schools which have no significant involvement in the desegregation programs of Access to Excellence. They are simply schools in transition

that happen this year to fall temporarily within the state's guidelines. The typical newly "desegregated" school has 69.7 percent minority children. On the average it lost 86 white children last year and became 6.3 percent more minority in its racial composition. If it continued to change at its present rate there will be few remaining whites within three or four years. The "progress" is neither the consequence of the Chicago plan nor is it producing significant and stable desegregation. The standard is misleading and it detracts from serious analysis of Chicago desegregation.

TABLE 8

Chicago Schools Which Came into Compliance with State Rules in Fall 1978

	Percent Minority 1977	Percent Minority 1978	Percent Change	White Students 1977	White Students 1978	Change White Students	Minority Students 1977	Minority Students 1978	Change Minority Students
Lakeview High	59.9	64.2	+ 4.3	852	699	-153	1,273	1,256	- 17
Blaine	59.8	64.2	+ 4.4	412	320	- 92	612	574	- 38
Kelvyn Park High	53.4	63.6	+10.2	783	549	-234	896	961	+ 65
Wilson Occ. Hi Br.	57.7	64.1	+ 6.4	63	49	- 14	86	33	- 53
Brentano	58.8	63.7	+ 4.9	469	395	- 74	669	693	- 24
Mozart	57.5	67.5	+10	428	320	-108	578	664	+ 86
Wicker Park Prim.	93.7	92.8	- .0	42	45	- 3	588	580	- 8
Metro High	59.6	74.0	+14	138	89	- 49	204	253	+ 49
Fulton	52.0	63.7	+11.7	478	374	-104	517	655	+138
Senn	59.2	63.5	+ 4.3	1,102	904	-198	1,596	1,574	- 22
Swift	59.9	63.6	+ 3.7	305	268	- 37	452	474	+ 22
Nobel	57.5	67.1	+ 9.6	370	314	- 56	501	641	+140

A desegregation policy which is concerned with producing real integration and maintaining it as long as possible must be based upon an analysis of the real urban community, the city plus the suburbs. I believe that the state board should adopt a new policy for the Chicago metropolitan area, suspending the operation of the existing standards in any area school district which has more than one-third minority students and is experiencing rapid racial change (10 percent or greater growth in the proportion minority in the total district enrollment within five years). The emphasis in such systems should be on stabilizing existing integrated neighborhoods and desegregating the schools to the greatest possible extent under one of two policies:

a. a standard calling for approximately equal representation of minority and majority children in as many schools as possible, with a guarantee from the district that integration will be maintained, perhaps through the policies applied in Morgan Park and Gage Park.[31]

b. desegregation of schools to represent the approximate metropolitan-wide distribution of students--schools would be approximately 25 to 45 percent minority. Any such school would be considered integrated.

The problem with both of these standards is that they would leave a great many black and Latino children in segregated schools in Chicago and in some suburban communities. Their advantage is that they would have a far better chance than the existing policies of moving a substantial number of children into situations of genuine and lasting integration, situations that are practically non-existent within Chicago and found in few suburbs. There is no way that full desegregation can be achieved without crossing district lines. Since the metropolitan-wide standard would permit significantly less desegregation within a single district with a large minority enrollment it should be considered only when major efforts for cross district transfers have been organized.

The legal and moral dilemma that would face the state board would arise from the fact that the board would be recognizing officially that there is nothing that local school boards can do to successfully end all the segregation in their districts, even if that segregation is unambiguously unconstitutional, as it probably is in Chicago. In adopting such a standard, which is the best of the poor choices the board has left at this point, the board must assume heavy responsibility to initiate desegregation plans that run beyond the boundaries of individual school districts. Possible approaches will be discussed later.

A Performance Standard for Chicago. One alternative approach which has been extensively discussed in the Chicago case is that the city should be expected to achieve approximately the level of desegregation which has been reached in some big city desegregation plans. While it is not reasonable to expect that Chicago can solve the entire problem of segregation within its boundaries, it seems plausible to require that Chicago reduce its level of segregation as much as other big cities with similar difficulties. An analysis by Professor Reynolds Farley of the University of Michigan found that in several big city plan the segregation level was reduced by about 40 points on the segregation index.[32] In other words, in a city where before desegregation it would have been necessary to move 85 percent of the minority children to have a random distribution of children among schools after a central city plan was implemented it would be necessary to move 45 percent. (In a number of metropolitan plans the index fell very close to zero.)

In Chicago at the present time the segregation index of blacks from whites is 90.3 and the index of segregation of Hispanics from whites is 65.1.

The levels could be reduced the necessary amount by moving about 40,000 whites and 40,000 minority children into desegregated schools, about one-sixth of the total enrollment. Although the large majority of black and Hispanic children would remain segregated the standard would require far more than Chicago has ever accomplished.

This performance standard must, however, be coupled with some revised definition of desegregation. Otherwise Chicago school authorities could report schools with 10 percent whites or 10 percent blacks as fully integrated. It is encouraging that the Chicago school officials have accepted the 80,000 figure as a general goal in their comments. The State Board could well use this as a beginning point and give it meaning and concrete definition.

None of the three possible approaches to a new desegregation plan discussed here is without difficulties. All would call for a great deal less movement within Chicago than a simple application of the existing rules would require. The great advantage of the change is that it would replace a standard that is almost meaningless in Chicago and will not be enforced with one that can be defended and should be enforced.

Policy Options

In the long run, continuation of the existing residential trends, even assuming no white flight from public schools, would mean that not only the entire Chicago system but also a substantial number of suburban districts would become almost exclusively minority school districts. At a time when large numbers of the seats in Chicago's white suburban school districts are empty, there is a great potential for using some of this space in excellent schools for increasing integration. The State Board of Education should take the following steps:

1) point out the need and the opportunity for cross-district solutions.
2) recognize that the long-term approach to desegregation must include the white suburbs.
3) urge enactment of state and federal legislation to spur and finance cross-district exchanges.
4) apply to HEW and private foundations for start-up financing to begin voluntary transfers in the first districts next fall.
5) appoint a staff member to work with Chicago suburban superintendents and school boards in explaining the program and coordinating funding efforts.
6) develop a report on the loss of schools and teaching and administrative jobs likely in the Chicago suburbs over the next decade if the present decline in school utilization continues.
7) request all suburban school districts to formally respond, in writing to the invitation to participate and ask those boards refusing to participate to explain why.

8) formally request the department of Housing and Urban Development and each local government and public housing authority to develop plans which will support rather than undermine integrated education. (This issue is discussed in detail in the final section of this report.)

Metropolitan Magnets. One striking contrast between the public schools of Chicago and those of New York has been the failure to develop outstanding programs of national standing such as the Bronx School of Science. Metropolitan Chicago has some nationally ranked high schools but they are comprehensive schools serving only a tiny fraction of the eligible students of the area. The best programs are rationed in the most undemocratic way--they are kept for the students who need them the least and whose parents have the knowledge, the money, and the access to the appropriate expensive real estate market.

The Chicago area has the educational and cultural assets and the transportation system necessary to sustain at least a small set of exceptional public schools made available to students throughout the area as part of a desegregation plan. Some programs might well be located in schools in the Loop, which students could easily reach through mass transit or commuting with a parent. Others could be located in integrated neighborhoods in outlying areas of the city or in the inner suburbs. Special programs created in some of the excellent schools of Evanston, for example, might well attract both whites from outer suburbs and black and Latino children from the city. Since Evanston's shrinking birthrate has created a great deal of surplus school capacity, the students could be easily accomodated. In fact it might save the city from the bitter school closing battles it otherwise faces. Such programs could be particularly useful in integrated communities where the schools are rapidly changing. Some of these school districts are so small that drawing in two or three hundred white students could do a great deal to help in stabilization. Possessing an excellent school widely publicized throughout the metropolitan area would also help keep a community attractive for

white as well as minority home buyers and renters.

Placement of a few magnet programs in suburbs with few if any black or Latino families might also serve a useful function. They could initiate cross-racial contacts in some areas that have virtually none and they could make some minority families aware of communities and housing choices outside of the normal migration paths.

The dismal experience with magnets inside Chicago should underline the importance of developing such programs slowly and with unquestionable quality. The state superintendent of education, in conjunction with top leaders of area universities, cultural institutions, the media, and industry could appoint task forces of experts to design the curriculum and supervise the initial administrative and staffing decisions. The institutions could commit themselves to offering internships or special supplementary training programs for the selected students. Launching one or two exceptional new schools and converting an equal number of existing schools to a more broadly based student body each year would be a reasonable initial goal. If properly located and designed I am sure that these schools would generate intense interest. As a teacher of students from public and private high schools througout the Chicago metropolitan area I am well aware of the shortage of genuinely excellent programs.

First preference in the location of the early magnets should go to integrated areas. Although the magnets will have only a small impact on overall segregation problems they might be a significant boost to those communities.

School Reorganization. At the same time that the problem of suburban segregation has become more important, school districts

also face the most important set of decisions about facilities and staffing since the height of the baby boom. The drastic decline in the birth rate in the last generation and the aging of the population of the older suburbs have created a large oversupply of schools and teachers. By last year the suburbs had one-fourth more schools than they needed with the expectation that things would get worse. Some communities may have to shut half of their schools.

School closing decisions are inevitably decisions about school attendance areas. Each time one group of children have to be reassigned away from their former neighborhood school to another school or schools which will have expanded attendance boundaries. The State Board has the power and the duty to regulate this process under the Armstrong Act. The regulations might require that each district with significant minority enrollment or within a mile of significant minority population assess the local demographic trends and devise a plan to use the rezoning to support desegregation. (Rezoning in a way which increased segregation would violate both state law and the federal constitution.) The state might specify that schools in decent working order in stably integrated neighborhoods should not be closed except in extraordinary circumstances. This policy would reduce the need for busing and reward those who lived in integrated communities with convenient walk-in schools.

The state board could require, before a school is closed, that the local school board file a statement that the closing will not intensify problems of racial integration or destabilize an integrated community. At that time the local board could also be asked to consider and report on the possibility of using its excess space for one of the following: (1) voluntary transfers out from segregated

schools, (2) a magnet school, or (3) transfer of the land and to provide a site for low income housing which might increase the number of minority children who lived in the area and did not require transportation to integrated schools.

A related proposal might require school districts in outer suburbs still in need of more buildings to consider alternatives that would increase or stabilize integration. Such communities could, for example, contract for available spaces in nearby integrated school districts, avoiding the necessity of a large capital expenditure and receiving a special incentive payment from the state. This approach would also help prevent a glut of excess schools in the outer suburbs a decade from now.

The shrinking of enrollments raises a more basic question of district consolidation. As the number of students declines in a small system so does the range of curriculum that can be offered. The per child administrative overhead increases very rapidly. Some suburban school districts should be consolidated for purely educational reasons. Others for a combination of educational and civil rights reasons. The state board should review the experience of Missouri state school authorities in the consolidation of a black St. Louis suburban district with a nearby white system. Actions of this sort, on a larger scale, will be essential to preserve integrated education in the Chicago suburbs.

Metropolitan Litigation.

The inescapable long-term issue for Chicago is the question of metropolitan desegregation. In a metropolitan area where a clearly inadequate central city school system will soon be both overwhelmingly minority and increasingly forced to implement substantial annual cutbacks even in existing school programs, some form of combination with the suburbs may offer the only answer not only for desegregation but

for survival of worthwhile public education in the city. The central city will serve minority students from the weakest backgrounds (many middle class minority families will be in their own segregated suburbs) and rely on a tax base that has not been able to keep up with inflation for years. The national mood on taxes means that transfer payments from Washington and Springfield will not make up the gap. The 1980 Census and the reapportionment that will follow will very seriously weaken the leverage of Chicago and other central cities in Congress and state legislatures, threatening even the maintenance of the existing special programs. City schools will rapidly decay in the midst of one of the nation's richest urban complexes with hundreds of fine well-financed schools running well below capacity.

The metropolitan issue will arise because their will be no other option. The Chicago school board may well join the boards in Kansas City, Indianapolis, Detroit, Richmond, Wilmington, Louisville, and elsewhere in concluding that a metropolitan approach is essential, not only because of the negative effects of limited desegregation plans but also because it is the only route toward a fair share in the wealth and talents of the metropolitan area for the school system and the students who most need an equal opportunity. The Chicago school board and the suburban systems faced with the threat or reality of resegregation should initiate research on a metropolitan case. There are very strong barriers to such cases since the Supreme Court's 1974 Detroit decision but there is also more massive evidence of housing and school segregation in the Chicago area than anywhere outside the South. Most simply, research should be initiated because there is no good alternative.

The State Board and Residential Integration

Discussion of school integration problems with school officials almost invariably generate both comments that something must be done about housing and then a quiet conclusion that, after all, there is not much school officials can do about housing. Perhaps the school authorities underestimate their own role. The fact is that decisions on the location of housing are normally made with little or no consideration for their implications for school segregation. Thus it is not at all uncommon for housing projects funded with federal funds and planned by or approved by local authorities to increase segregation and increase the need for busing. Sometimes these decisions also have the peculiarly destructive consequences of destabilizing integrated neighborhoods or communities.

The State Board could take several steps:

1) request local school authorities to analyze and comment on the implications of public and private housing proposals for school integration
2) make its own analysis of the implications of large developments, particularly those receiving public subsidies
3) strongly support efforts of communities with well-integrated schools to stabilize residential integration and avoid ghettoization
4) formally request the Secretary of Housing Urban Development and the HUD Regional office to deny funding for projects that intensify school segregation and to give special preference to those which expand integration or stabilize and upgrade existing integrated areas.

It makes no sense to have the government pay high prices for the construction or leasing of housing in areas where children will be forced to attend segregated schools or the government will be forced to provide funds to move them away from the new housing for their education. It is about time that federal, state, and local housing officials begin to devise plans for residential and educational integration. Minority and white families would prefer naturally integrated schools. It is time that the housing officials stopped being part of the problem and began to be part of the solution. School people rarely deal with ranking housing officials. It is time for the state board to bring this matter to their attention with the greatest urgency. Better housing policies would have only a marginal impact in the near future, but they might at least avoid some totally unnecessary problems.

One related issue may deserve attention. School boards now confront the problems of excess buildings and building sites produced by the rapid decline in the birth rate. School districts which wish to minimize busing should consider very seriously the possibility that these sites could be used for construction of low and moderate income housing. Such efforts could be greatly aided by short-circuiting the problems of purchasing and assembling parcels of land. Any community that accepted housing which brought in a significant number of minority students might well be offered an exemption from any busing out.

Residential Patterns in Chicago. A principal justification for a purely voluntary approach to desegregation in Chicago is the stated desire to stabilize residential integration. One issue upon which all participants in this controversy apparently agree is that residential integration is highly

desirable and that whenever possible public policy should encourage stable neighborhood integration which will produce integrated walk-in schools. A good desegregation plan should surely attempt to foster and expand any neighborhood integration.

Last spring the Technical Assistance Committee on the Chicago Desegregation Plan made specific recommendations on this issue. It urged that planning begin with "a careful analysis of the demographics of individual communities within the city." It suggested that Chicago might adopt the policy of exempting well-integrated communities from busing plans and that the city "take no steps to disrupt well-integrated schools that draw both white and minority children in substantial numbers."[33]

Though talk about residential patterns has continued unabated, there has been no serious analysis of existing integration in the city. City policies supporting integration have not been developed. The city could, for instance, increase the stability and attractiveness of the stable integrated communities by officially recognizing them, offering to provide assistance to stabilization efforts and guaranteeing them against any busing out in the future. A recent analysis of some North Side communities by the City Club has found a substantial revitalization of several areas but a lack of return to the city by families with school age children.[34] School authorities should work together with planners and experts in the real estate market in preparing a community-by-community analysis of the possibility of creating naturally integrated schools in these areas. It would be worth experimenting with the possibility of guaranteeing such communities stably integrated schools. Such an inducement, coupled with a package of attractive educational programs,

might persuade young couples to remain in the neighborhoods when their children reach school age. .Young families moving into integrated neighborhoods could be given preference for Chicago's very attractive mortgage bond program.

Plans developed with leaders in gentrifying neighborhoods and focusing on the earliest grades could help begin the process of building a long-term commitment to remain in Chicago. Until this happens the revitalization process will be virtually irrelevant to public education in in the city. Upgrading of communities will move minority children from one neighborhood to the next, bringing in no one to replace them in the classrooms.

The development of ghettos and barrios is so far advanced in Chicago that there are only a limited number of neighborhoods where stable integration remains possible. School officials should work with demographers and housing experts in identifying areas where supportive school policies might make a difference and make such actions integral parts of a general desegregation plan.

Conclusion

When Chicago civil rights groups first raised the problem of illegal school segregation in the city in the early sixties, most Chicago students were white and there were major opportunities for desegregation efforts within the central city. A generation has passed since that time and the political strength of the city has prevented the enforcement of state and federal law. Segregation has continued unabated at a level far above that of most major cities. Although the opposition to desegregation has often been justified as a way to stabilize Chicago's white population and white neighborhoods, white population and white school enrollment dropped precipitously. Ghettoization and resegregation are reaching into parts of the suburbs. Much less desegregation can now be accomplished within the city.

State policies must be altered to deal with the new realities of the Chicago metropolitan area. As many children as possible within the city should be placed in stably integrated schools with substantial numbers of both white and minority children. The standard for integration should be related to the composition of the true city, the metropolitan area, rather than individual school districts. No useful purpose is served by transporting minority children to other schools where the enrollment is almost nine-tenths minority and no useful purpose is served by assigning two white children to a classroom in a ghetto school. It would be very useful, on the other hand,to assure the maximum number of blacks, Latinos and white the opportunity to spend a school career in a school with stable integration, strong representation of each group, and new educational programs.

Access to Excellence has not accomplished these goals and there are no reasons to expect that it will. It is not really a desegregation plan. It had only very limited goals for desegregation and no machinery to see that those were achieved. Now that a voluntary approach has failed, the state must insist on mandatory reassignments for substantial numbers of students if they do not choose to transfer. Continued acceptance of the existing Access plan means continued acceptance of segregation for all but a handful of the minority children now attending segregated schools.

Failure to act now will only mean transferring an even larger problem of metropolitan segregation to the next generation. In a vast inter-dependent urban settlement where about one-third of the children are from minority groups the consequence of separate and unequal schools can only damage the future of the entire society. State and federal education and civil rights authorities need to develop workable policies and move step by step against Chicago's pervasive segregation.

Footnotes

[1] U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools: A Status Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 20-21.

[2] The segregation indices were calculated by the Illinois Office of Education from enrollment statistics supplied by the Chicago Public Schools.

[3] Chicago Fall Housing Report, 1978.

[4] Among Chicago blacks surveyed in 1975, 80 percent said that the city's white neighborhoods had adequate schools but only 16 percent believed the black schools were adequate. 87 percent said that white schools were "much better" and another 4 percent saw them as "moderately better." Only 1 percent of whites and 0 percent of blacks believed that the black schools were better. (George Surgeon, Judith Mayo, and Donald J. Bogue, Race Relations in Chicago: Second Survey, 1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Community and Family Study Center, 1976), p. 158.

[5] Chicago Board of Education, Access to Excellence Status Report, December 1978, p. xv; Fall Housing data.

[6] Interview with David Bennett, Deputy Superintendent Milwaukee Public Schools, February 26, 1979.

[7] Report by Reynolds Farley to Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, January 17, 1979, p. 31.

[8] Technical Assistance Committee on the Chicago Desegregation Plan, Integration in Chicago, Report to Illinois State Board of Education, May 11, 1978, p. 61.

[9] This argument, for instance, has appeared repeatedly in the editorials of the Chicago Tribune. See, for example, "A Lesson from Los Angeles," Chicago Tribune, October 30, 1978. The Chicago December 1978 Status Report also relied heavily on the comparison and on research done by the San Diego school district by David Armor to use in its desegregation case.

[10] John Egerton, Promise of Progress: Memphis School Desegregation, 1972-1973 (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1973), pp. 18-19.

[11] Micheal W. Giles, Douglas S. Gatlin, and Everett F. Cataldo, Determinants of Resegregation: Compliance/ Rejection Behavior and Policy Alternatives, report to National Science Foundation, June 1976.

[12]Christine Rossell, "The White Flight Debate: Its Current State and Policy Implications," Social Policy (November/December 1978)

[13]This year's drop in Boston's white enrollment was 3.1 percent. (Data provided by Professor Rossell, telephone interview, Jan. 16, 1979).

[14]Rossell, "The White Flight Debate."

[15]Reynolds Farley, "Report to Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles," November 14, 1978, p. 45.

[16]Michael R. Fitzgerald and David R. Morgan, "Assessing the Consequences of Public Policy: School Desegregation and White Flight in America," paper preseted at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 22, 1977.

[17]A major study of racial transition in Chicago's South Shore neighborhood concludes replacement is the central problem. (Harvey Luskin Molotch, Managed Integration: Dilemmas of Doing Good in the City (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972)).

[18]Chicago Urban League, Where Blacks Live: Race and Residence in Chicago in the 1970s, Spring 1978, p. 11.

[19]Franklin D. Wilson, "Patterns of White Avoidance," University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper, June 1978.

[20]Farley, "Supplementary Report to Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles," January 1979.

[21]Ibid.

[22]See table 6.

[23]Central cities across the U.S. show a net inflow of whites in their twenties, but a strong outmigration when they reach the child-bearing years.

[24] Giles, Gatlin, and Cataldo, Determinants of Resegregation, p. VIII-21.

[25] Chicago Sun-Times, October 1, 1978.

[26] Chicago Sun-Times, September 29, 1978.

[27] Chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 1978.

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[29] Nathanel L. Clay, "School Desegregation: A Conditioned Response," Chicago Daily Defender, April 19, 1978.

[30] Statement of the Chicago Urban League to the State Board of Education, December 14, 1978, p. 3.

[31] The standard that each desegregated school should be at least half-white has been widely used in desegregation policy, although it has tended to be displaced by a district-wide proportionate enrollment standard since the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg. The 50 percent standard was used in the influential Civil Rights Commission report, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, in the pioneering Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act and in the desegregation rules of some state boards of education. No court has ever imposed a racial balance plan on any city with a white minority.

[32] Farley estimated that by exchanging 40,000 black students with white students the city could lower its segregation index by 47 points, reaching the approximate level of black-white separation achieved by desegregation plans in Indianapolis, Memphis, Nashville, and Jacksonville, though still far more segregation than remained in San Francisco. (Reynolds Farley, "Integration Plans for the Chicago Public Schools: Comments about Demographic Trends and Their Implication for Desegregation Activities," draft report to Technical Assistance Committee, April 1978.

[33] Technical Assistance Committee on the Chicago Desegregation Plan, Integration in Chicago, report to the Illinois State Board of Education, May 11, 1978, p. 60.

[34] Chicago Tribune,